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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DAVID WHYTE, DAVID B. WHYTE,
DAN E. WHYTE, and TERRY WHYTE,
Plaintiffs-Respondents.
vs.

Case No. 14151

DERL CHRISTENSEN, and
MRS. DERL CHRISTENSEN,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action by respondents David Whvte, David
B, Whyte, Dan E. Whyte, and Terry Whyte for wages for labor
performed by them in the construction of an addition to
appellants1 home.

A Second Cause of Action was alleged by the

respondents but was not pursued and no evidence was introduced
in support of it.
Appellants counterclaimed against respondent David
Whyte for any amount found to be due laborers or materialmen,
claiming payment by appellants to respondent David VJhyte of
the full contract price.
Appellants further claimed damages from respondent
David Whyte for his failure to perform the work done upon
appellants1 home in a workmanlike manner.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before a jury in the District
Court of Salt Lake County before the Honorable Marcellus K.
Snow,

The jury returned a verdict and found:
1.

That respondent David Whyte was hired by the

appellants Christensen as a mere employee at an hourly wage
rate and not as a contractor and awarded judgment to the
respondents, and
2.

That respondent David Whyte substantially com-

pleted the remodeling work he agreed to do and that all work
done by him was done in a workmanlike manner and found no
cause of action on the appellants' counterclaim.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondents seek an affirmance of the judgment
entered by the trial court and costs of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents basically agree with appellants1 Statement
of Facts with certain clarification and modification as set
forth in the Argument.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANTS' MOTIOM FOR A
DIRECT VERDICT AT THE CLOSE OF RESPONDENTS' EVIDENCE,
The appellants assert that respondent David Whyte was
acting as a general contractor without a contractor's license.
I refer the Court to Section 58-23-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, which provides that it is unlawful for a person to
-2-
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act in the capacity of a contractor unless ne is ixv.v4..
then provides that (1) The securing of any construction or
building permit, or (2) The employment of any person on a construction project, or (3) The offering of any bid to do the
work of a contractor shall be evidence of a person acting in
the capacity of a contractor.

If we examine the evidence in

the principal case, we find that David Whyte did not meet any
one of these requirements.
Whyte told Christensen that he must obtain a building
permit and Christensen then went down and obtained the permit
himself, and when Christensen obtained the building permit, he
obtained it in the name of builder-owner, and Christensen
testified that he was a self-builder.

(R. 143)

Christensen

also testified that at no time did he ask Whyte to take out a
building permit, because he knew that Whyte did not have a
contractor's license.

(R. 143)

When the building was ready

for inspection, Mrs. Christensen called the building inspector
and had him come out and inspect it,

(R. 186-187)

The respondent did not employ or hire any individual
as an employee to work on the job. Whyte1s three sons, worked
with him, but they were also employees of Christensen, for at
the time the construction was discussed, Whyte mentioned this
to Christensen and Christensen agreed to it.

(R. 9, 129, 186)

Christensen told Whyte that he did not know of any specialist
and asked if Whyte would obtain them when needed.

Whyte did

contact the other craftsmen, but each time told them to see
Christensen, and he would give them the directions as to the
work he wanted done. Whyte never gave any directions to the
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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other craftsmen nor was he present at any time they were working on the job.

This was true in the case of the electrician

(R. 16, 94), the heating man (R. 15, 78) and the plumber (R. 14,
104), and, in fact, with the plumber Whyte did not know him
personally but just happened to contact him by phone at the
supply house.

(R. 14)

There is certainly not any evidence that a firm bid
was given by Whyte to do the construction job.

Christensen

asked Whyte to give him a rough idea of how much it would cost
to build the addition and Whyte told him it would cost approximately $6,000 plus the electrical work.

(R. 8)

While both

appellants testified that Whyte never stated an amount, they
said on a paper he had the figure of $5,500.00.

(R. 127, 189,

190)
Numerous times during the construction period, additional work was done by Whyte at the direction of Christensen,
such as the pouring of the garage floor and the patio, and
changing a wall. (R. 28, 27, 37, 38)

Christensen made changes

in the work of the other craftsmen, and also had them do additional work which was not discussed originally between Whyte
and Christensen.

(R. 150, 154, 155, 78, 94, 105)

Christensen

also furnished certain materials, such as a storm doer, bathroom
accessories, and siding, which he would not have been required
to do if it had been a firm contract.
181)

(R. 23, 24, 35, 150, 131,

Mrs. Christensen also worked on the job and so did Jerry,

Mr. Christensen1s brother-in-law, and if they had had a firm
contract, then there would have been no reason to have these
individuals work on the job.

(R. 22, 23, 194)
-4-
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Appellants also refer to Section 58-23-3(3) which
defines a contractor, and which provides that any person who
for a fixed sum, price, fee, percentage or other compensation
other than wages, undertakes with another person for the construction of a building, is a contractor.

Again I refer the

Court to the language of the legislature that it must be for a
set sum.

If it is for wages, then he is not a general contrac-

tor, and both the appellant (R. 9) and the respondent (R. 129)
knew and testified that Whyte was working for wages.
dispute was as to the exact amount of the wages.

The only

(R. 14 2, 143)

I refer the Court to the testimony given by Christensen on direct examination as found on pages 128 and 129 of the
Record.
Q (By Mr. Blackham) Did you have any discussion v/ith Mr. Whyte, concerning what his charges
for labor would be on this remodeling project?
A He told us the charge that he would charge
us would be, roughly, the same as what he made at
the Post Office.
Q
And was any dollar-amount given as to
what his charges would be?
A
Well, I knew, roughly, what his pay step
was at the Post Office.
Q
But would the figure of $7.00 per hour—
was this discussed?
A

No.

Q
And what was your understanding of what
the amount that Mr. Whyte would be charging for
his labor?
A
hour.

Just what he made at the Post Office, an

Q
And did you have knowledge of what that
amount would have been, then, in May of 1973?
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A

Yes.

Q

And what would that amount have boon?

A
time.

Between five and six dollars, at that

Q

Is that for what period of time?

A

That was back in f 73.

Q
I know; be five or six dollars, per day,
or what?
A

Per hour.

Q
Per hour. What was your rate of pay at
the Post Office, at that time, Mr. Christensen?
A

5.65, an hour.

Q
And did Mr. Whyte earn more at the Post
Office, at that time, than you did?
A

Yes, he did.

In the Utah case of Thorley v. Kolob Fish and Game
Club, 13 Utah 2d 294, 373 P.2d 574, the appellant contended the
respondent could not recover because he was an unlicensed contractor.

The Court held a test to determine whether the rela-

tionship was that of an independent contractor or that of an
employer and employee is the right of control-

Throughout the

course of construction Christensen continually exercised control
over the job.

He told Whyte that they would arrange for the

cement and when it would be there.

Whyte attempted to get some

new siding to put on the home, and Christensen told him no, that
he would find the old in the spring when the snow melts and put
it on.

Christensen would not allow Whyte to buy a new storm

door but got one himself and also got other accessories and also
exercised control over the work performed by the other craftsmen
and told them how he wanted it done and made many changes from
the original discussion.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT II
THE DECISION OF THE JURY WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE.
The Court is well aware of the rule of review as set
forth in the case of Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389,
360 P.2d 176.

(See also Lowe v. Rosenlof, 12 Utah 2d 190,

364 P.2d 418.)
In considering the attack on
the findings and judgment of the trial
court it is our duty to follow these
cardinal rules of review: to indulge
them a presumption of validity and
correctness; to require the appellant
to sustain the burden of showing error;
to review the record in the liaht most
favorable to them; and not to disturb
them if they find substantial support
in the evidence.
Both the appellant and the respondent were full-time
employees of the United States Post Office and saw each other
daily.

Whyte had had some experience as a builder and Christen-

sen was desirous of having some remodeling done on his home.
Christensen had not had building experience and did not know
any craftsmen, so Whyte suggested various craftsmen to Christensen and had them contact him direct and he gave them directions
as to what work should be done. Whyte also had a knowledge as
to what material was needed in the construction and had an
account with Anderson Lumber Company where he was able to get a
10 percent discount, and to save his friend money, said that he
would charge the material in his name and Christensen could
then pay him (P. 12,. 13, 143, 150), being a loose relationship
between friends, with Christensen wanting to get the work done
as inexpensively as possible.

I refer the Court to the dis-

cussion set forth in Point I as to the further relationship between the two.
-7-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT III
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 REPRESENTS THE LAW IN THE STATE OF UTAH.
Instruction No. 5 was neither confusing to the jury
nor prejudicial to the appellants.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Thorley v.
KoJLofc), supra, held,
An important test to determine
whether the relation is that of an
independent contractor or that of an
employer and employee is the right
of control. The right to end the
services whenever the party sees fit
is also an important test.
The Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-23-3(3) defines
a contractor as one who is working for other than wages.
Respondents submit that there is no unclarity or confusion in Instruction No. 5, but looking at it in the light
most favorable to appellants, alleges that appellants failed
to read the Instruction as a whole.

The appellants in their

argument have taken Instruction No. 5 out of context without
relating it to the other Instructions given by the Court.

The

Court in Instruction No. 25, specifically instructed the jury
that they are to consider all the Instructions as a whole and
to regard each in the light of all the others.

Instructions

Nos. 4, 9, 10 and 11 clarify and exemplify Instruction No. 5,
and when read as a whole could leave no doubt in the minds of
the jury what the meaning and intent of Instruction No. 5 was.
CONCLUSION
This Court should uphold the trial court and find the
evidence is sufficient to affirm the judgment in favor of
-8-
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respondents and against appellants.
Respectfully submitted,

Homer F. Wilkinson
Attorney for Plaintiffs and
Respondents
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I personally delivered two
copies of the foregoing to Don Blackham, Attorney for
Defendants-Appellants, at 3535 South 3200 West, Salt Lake
City, Utah 34119, this

day of April, 1976.
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